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Martin Feldstein 
Reforming the social security retirement program is an issue of enormous prac- 
tical importance. Although elected officials are still unwilling to confront the 
serious problems of our social security system, its deteriorating financial con- 
dition will eventually force major reforms. Whether those reforms are good or 
bad, whether they  deal with the basic  economic problems of  the  system or 
merely protect the solvency of existing institutional arrangements, will depend 
in part on whether economists provide the appropriate intellectual framework 
for analyzing reform alternatives. The papers presented in this volume repre- 
sent an attempt to contribute to that framework. 
Major policy changes that affect the public at large can happen in our de- 
mocracy only when there is widespread public support for the new direction 
of policy. In the field of economics, the views of the media, of other private- 
sector opinion leaders, and of politicians and their advisers depend very much 
on their perception of what economists believe is feasible and correct. Funda- 
mental policy reforms in a complex area like social security also require the 
development of technical expertise, both in and out of government, about the 
options for change and the likely consequences of alternative reforms. Fortu- 
nately, as the papers and discussion reported in this volume show, an expanding 
group of economists is now thinking and writing about social security reform. 
Part  1 of this volume contains studies of the actual experience with priva- 
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tizing  social  security  in  five  very  different  countries:  Chile, Australia,  the 
United Kingdom, Mexico, and Argentina. Part 2 deals with a variety of practi- 
cal issues that the United States will have to face if  we as a nation want to 
make a similar transition to a system of individual funded accounts. This intro- 
duction  provides background  for the  subsequent  chapters by  discussing  the 
economic costs imposed by an unfunded social security system and the nature 
of  the gains that would be achieved by  switching to a funded system. It then 
summarizes the questions that are considered in the individual country studies 
and reviews the subjects of the chapters that deal with the United States. 
Before going further, a word about the term privatizing social security is in 
order. The term privatize is ambiguous and raises political objections if it sug- 
gests an abrogation of government responsibility for the income of the aged. 
In this volume, privatizing  social  security  refers  to the shift from unfunded 
pay-as-you-go programs  to mandatory  funded programs  with individual  ac- 
counts. Because the contributions  are mandatory, the government retains re- 
sponsibility  for assuring retirement  income to all. The benefits  of  a funded 
system that are discussed in this volume refer to capital accumulation  and to 
the resulting reduction in labor market distortions. I take the essence of priva- 
tizing to be whether individuals are also given control over their own invest- 
ments. In a funded but not privatized system, the government would have to 
invest in private stocks, bonds, and mortgages. There are obvious reasons for 
not  wanting the government to acquire  very large investments in individual 
private companies.  Although the administrative costs may be higher when indi- 
viduals have control over their investments, major U.S. mutual funds have re- 
duced their expenses to less than one-quarter of  1 percent of assets. Even in a 
privatized  system, the government might constrain the mix of  assets in which 
individuals are permitted  to invest and might provide a general safety net to 
protect individuals whose investments did not produce adequate retirement in- 
come. The chapters in part  1 of this volume consider  the way  that different 
countries have dealt with these issues, while Mitchell (chap. 10) discusses ad- 
ministrative issues in more detail. 
The Magnitude of the Problem 
The social security program of retirement, disability, and survivor benefits 
is the largest program of the U.S. government, with outlays of more than $350 
billion  in  1997. The 12.4 percent employer-employee payroll tax that is ear- 
marked for social security exceeds the income tax obligations for most taxpay- 
ers. An alternative measure of the magnitude of the social security program is 
social security wealth, the present actuarial value of the social security benefits 
to which the current adult population will be entitled at age sixty-five (or to 
which they are already entitled if they are older than sixty-five) minus the pres- 
ent value of the social security taxes that they will pay before reaching  age 3  Introduction 
sixty-five.‘ Social security wealth had grown by 1995 to about $7 trillion, equal 
to the size of the GDP.’ Since that is equivalent to more than $35,000 for every 
adult in the country, the value of social security wealth substantially exceeds 
all other financial assets for the vast majority of American households. In the 
aggregate, social security wealth exceeds the combined value of pension and 
life insurance reserves and equals nearly half of all private financial wealth as 
conventionally measured. 
Social security wealth is of course not real wealth but only a claim on cur- 
rent and future taxpayers. Instead of labeling this key magnitude social security 
wealth, I could have called it the nation’s net social security liability. Like ordi- 
nary government debt, social security wealth has the power to crowd out pri- 
vate capital accumulation. And social security wealth will continue to grow as 
long as our current system remains unchanged, displacing an even larger stock 
of capital . 
The $7  trillion  social security liability  in  1995 was twice as large as the 
official national debt. Even if the officially defined budget deficit is eliminated 
in 2002 so that the traditional national debt is no longer increasing, the real 
national debt in the form of the social security liability is currently scheduled 
to increase in that year by more than $300 billi~n.~ 
Looking further into the future, the aggregate social security liability will 
grow as the population expands, as it becomes relatively older, and as incomes 
rise. Government actuaries predict that, under existing law, the tax rate required 
to pay each year’s social security benefit will rise over the next fifty years from 
the present level of slightly less than  12 percent to more than  18 percent and 
perhaps to as much as 23 per~ent.~ 
The financial problems of the social security system are therefore very seri- 
ous indeed. But even more fundamental are the economic effects of continuing 
with an unfunded system. The next section discusses the large deadweight loss 
that an unfunded system causes by  distorting the supply of labor and the form 
I. The concept of  social security  wealth was introduced and defined explicitly in  Feldstein 
(1974). 
2. This estimate  is based  on the disaggregated  model presented  in  Feldstein and Samwick 
(chap. 6 in this volume), which has been calibrated to the aggregate benefits projected by the social 
security actuaries. An earlier calculation reported in Feldstein (1996a) was based on a simpler 
estimation procedure that assumed a faster growth of future benefits. 
3.  These increases in social security wealth and its liability twin are the core of the massive 
intergenerational transfers that Auerbach, Gokhale, and  Kotlikoff (1991,  1994) have warned us 
about in their important studies of generational accounting. 
4.  The 18 percent rate is based on what the social security actuaries call their intermediate 
alternative I1 assumptions, while the 23 percent rate is based on the somewhat more pessimistic 
alternative I11 assumptions. Experience suggests that even these alarming predictions may be too 
optimistic. In 1983, the social security actuaries calculated that a 12 percent rate would be enough 
to finance social security benefits until the year 2065. A dozen years later, these projections have 
been revised to show that the social security fund will he exhausted by  2031 if the tax rate is not 
increased or benefits reduced. 4  Martin Feldstein 
of compensation. I then discuss the intertemporal welfare loss that results from 
depressed  capital  accumulation  and  the  potential  gain  from  shifting  to  a 
funded system.s 
A common feature of all the foreign systems discussed in this volume is the 
provision of a universal system of retirement benefits for the aged. The analy- 
ses of the United States in this volume also assume that the nation is politically 
committed to such a universal system. An alternative would be a means-tested 
system that provides benefits only to those individuals who, through inadver- 
tence, bad luck, or strategic behavior, reach old age with income and assets 
that are below some specified level. Although I believe that such an alternative 
deserves careful consideration, this possibility has not been studied in the cur- 
rent project  .6 
The Deadweight Loss of the Labor Market Distortions 
The social security payroll tax distorts the supply of labor and the form of 
compensation.’ Moreover, although the link between the social security taxes 
that individuals pay and their subsequent benefits means that the statutory pay- 
roll tax rate overstates the effective individual marginal tax rates, the manda- 
tory social security contributions are nevertheless real taxes with very substan- 
tial deadweight losses. These losses are inevitable because of the low return 
implied by the pay-as-you-go character of the unfunded social security system. 
Unlike private pensions and individual retirement accounts, the social secu- 
rity system does not invest the money that it collects in stocks and bonds but 
pays those funds out as benefits in the same year that they are collected.* The 
rate of return that individuals earn on their mandatory social security contribu- 
tions is therefore  far less than they could earn in a private pension  or in a 
funded social security system. As Paul Samuelson (1958) first taught us forty 
years ago, an unfunded social security program with a constant tax rate pro- 
vides a positive rate of return that, in equilibrium, is equal to the rate of growth 
of the social security payroll tax base. The 2.6 percent average annual rate of 
5. For an earlier discussion of the potential effect of a social security fund on national capital 
accumulation, see Feldstein (1975, 1977). 
6. For an analysis of the conditions under which an unfunded means-tested system would pro- 
vide a higher level of social welfare than an unfunded universal program, see Feldstein (1987a). 
It would be desirable to extend this analysis to include the possibility of funding both alternatives. 
The foreign programs described in pt.  1 of this volume generally provide an unfunded safety net 
in addition to the mandatory funded accounts. 
7.  I do not discuss the distortion to the retirement decision because that could be remedied by 
eliminating the retirement test and by other changes within the unfunded system. 
8. Although the social security system has been accumulating a fund since 1983 to smooth the 
path of tax rates, more than 90 percent of payroll tax receipts are still paid out immediately as 
benefits, and the assets in  the social security trust fund are only about 5  percent of  the social 
security liabilities. 5  Introduction 
growth of real wages and salaries since 1960 can therefore illustrate the yield 
of an unfunded social security pr~gram.~ 
I might just note that, in contrast to this 2.6 percent potential future yield, 
the rate of  return on social security contributions  since the inception of the 
program has been kept artificially high by the sharp increase in the social secu- 
rity tax rate.’O The combined employer-employee tax rate rose from just 2 per- 
cent in  1940 to 3 percent in 1950, 6 percent in  1960, 10 percent in  1980, and 
12 percent since 1988. Thus, those who got in on the ground floor of the social 
security program and are now retired paid taxes at relatively low rates but are 
receiving benefits that are financed by a much higher tax rate on current em- 
ployees. The resulting very high real return on social security contributions has 
sustained political support for the existing system. But such a sixfold increase 
in tax rates cannot happen again.’I 
In contrast to the 2.6 percent “equilibrium” return on social security contri- 
butions, the real pretax return on nonfinancial corporate capital averaged 9.3 
percent over the same thirty-five-year period since 1960.12 That is the return 
that each individual’s retirement  saving could have earned in a fully funded 
government system or in a privatized system if  the government credited the 
corporate tax receipts back to each account. The difference between the 2.6 
percent social security return and the 9.3 percent real return implies that man- 
datory contributions to an unfunded social security plan are real taxes with a 
very substantial deadweight loss.I3 
A simplified example will indicate the magnitude of the implied tax wedge. 
Consider an employee who contributes $1,000 to social security at age forty- 
five to buy benefits that will be paid at age seventy-five. With a 2.6 percent 
yield, the $1,000 grows to $2,160 after the thirty years. In contrast, a yield of 
9.3 percent would allow the individual to buy the same $2,160 retirement in- 
9. The social security actuaries now contemplate an even lower long-term real rate of return of 
about 2.0 percent because of the slower growth of the population and of real wages. 
10. Samuelson’s (1958) analysis shows that the rate of return is equal to the rate of growth of 
the tax base plus the rate of growth of the tax rate. 
11.  The increases in the payroll tax rate that are projected for the next fifty years are needed 
just to offset the changing demographic structure and the lower growth of earnings: they do not 
imply higher rates of return. As noted above, the rapid aging of the population and other recent 
changes imply that the return would be significantly lower than 2.6 percent for the current younger 
generation of employees. 
12. This 9.3 percent return combines profits before all federal, state, and local taxes with the 
net interest paid. The method of calculation (described in Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux 
1983) has been applied to the more recent data in Poterba and Samwick (1995) and Rippe (1995). 
13.  In practice, individuals do not earn the full 9.3 percent pretax rate of return even on retire- 
ment saving. Individual retirement accounts and private pension plans earn that return net of fed- 
eral, state, and local corporate taxes. Since those taxes averaged 42 percent of the pretax return 
(Rippe 1995), the real net yield available to savers has been about 5.4 percent. In principle, how- 
ever, a funded retirement system could deliver the full 9.3 percent pretax return to each individual 
saver. But even the lower 5.4 percent net return implies that the social security contributions are a 
substantial tax. 6  Martin Feldstein 
come for only $15O.I4  Thus, forcing individuals to use the unfunded system 
dramatically increases their cost of buying retirement income. In the current 
example, a funded plan would permit individuals to buy retirement income at 
just  15 percent  of  the  price  that  they  must  pay  in  the  unfunded  program, 
allowing the 12.4  percent social security tax rate to be replaced by a 1.9  percent 
contribution. The remaining  10.5 percent excess mandatory contribution is a 
real tax for which the individual gets nothing in retum.15 
The deadweight loss caused by this 10.5 percent tax is much larger than the 
“small triangle”  that typically comes to mind when we think of deadweight 
losses. This is true for two distinct reasons. 
First, because the social security payroll tax is imposed on top of federal 
and state income taxes, the deadweight loss is not a small triangle but a much 
larger trapezoid. With  a federal marginal tax  rate of  28 percent  (for single 
individuals with taxable incomes over $23,000 and married couples with com- 
bined incomes over $38,000) and a typical state income tax rate of 5 percent, 
the social security tax comes on top of an initial 33 percent marginal income 
tax rate.16  A little arithmetic shows that the incremental deadweight loss that 
results from the additional 10.5 percent net social security tax is equal to 4.6 
percent of  the product of the payroll tax base and the compensated elasticity 
of that tax base with respect to the net of tax share.” That is about ten times as 
large as the deadweight loss that would result if the social security tax were 
the only tax. 
The second reason that the deadweight loss is substantially larger than is 
commonly assumed is that the payroll tax distorts much more than the number 
of hours that individuals work. More specifically, it affects such other dimen- 
sions of labor supply as occupational choice, location, and effort. It also dis- 
torts the form in which compensation is taken, shifting taxable cash into un- 
taxed fringe benefits,  nice working conditions, etc. These distortions to the 
14. With a 5.4 percent net rate of return, the individual can buy the $2,160 retirement income 
for $446, less than half the cost with the unfunded social security program. 
15. The extent of the effective tax depends on the taxpayer’s age (or, more generally, on the 
amount of time that will elapse between the payment of the tax and the receipt of the benefit). 
Replacing the forty-five-year-old in the example with a thirty-five-year-old who has forty years 
until retirement raises the net tax from 10.5 to 11.4 percent, while raising the age of the individual 
to sixty reduces the net tax to 7.6 percent. 
16.  The combination of the 33 percent rate and the 10.5 percent net social security tax implies 
a 43.5 percent rate. However, since employers pay half the 15.3 percent statutory payroll tax, the 
marginal tax rate on the full pretax marginal product of labor is (4331.0765 =) 40.4 percent. 
17. Edgar Browning (1987) showed that, when the relevant behavioral elasticity is measured 
in the presence of the tax, the original Harberger (1964) formula for the deadweight loss of a tax 
with marginal tax rate t on a wage base of WL  must be modified to DWL = 0.5 dwL/(  1 -  t), 
where E is the compensated elasticity of the tax base (wL)  with respect to the marginal net of tax 
share, 1 -  t. The increase in the deadweight loss because the marginal tax rate is at t? rather than 
r, is therefore ADWL = 0.5~(r:  -  rT)wU( I -  tZ).  Thus, a pure payroll tax of (10.5/1.0765 =) 9.8 
percent with no other tax present would induce a deadweight loss of 0.0053~wL.  But, in the pres- 
ence of a preexisting income tax of 33 percent, the 10.5 percent payroll tax raises the deadweight 
loss by  ADWL = 0.046~wL. 7  Introduction 
form of  compensation are in effect distortions to the individual's pattern of 
consumption. They are, dollar for dollar, as important as the distortions to labor 
supply. In a recent paper (Feldstein 1995c), I showed that the deadweight loss 
caused by  this full range of  distortions-the  number of  working hours, the 
broader dimensions of  labor supply, and the pattern of consumption implied 
by the form of compensation and by the use of tax deductions-can  be evalu- 
ated quite simply in the traditional Harberger framework by using the compen- 
sated elasticity of taxable income (with respect to the net of tax share) in place 
of the usual compensated elasticity of labor supply. Because there are so many 
aspects of behavior that affect taxable income, this elasticity (and therefore the 
associated deadweight loss) is much larger than the traditional supply elasticity 
of working hours. 
To estimate the elasticity of total taxable income with respect to the net of 
tax rate, I studied the tax returns of  a panel of  taxpayers before and after the 
1986 Tax Reform Act (Feldstein 1995a). These data imply a range of elasticity 
estimates between 1 and 1  S,  all much larger than the traditional labor supply 
elasticity. 
This elasticity of the income tax base is likely to exceed the elasticity of the 
social security payroll tax base because itemized deductions and changes in 
portfolio income do not influence the base of the payroll tax. To be very conser- 
vative, for the current calculation I assume that the relevant compensated elas- 
ticity of the payroll tax base with respect to the net of tax share is only 0.5. 
Putting these pieces together implies that the deadweight loss due to the net 
social security tax is about 2.3  percent of the social security payroll tax base- 
about $67 billion in 1995.19  This deadweight loss is about 1 percent of GDP 
and about one-fifth of total social security payroll tax revenue. 
In practice, the deadweight loss of the payroll tax is exacerbated by the hap- 
hazard relations between benefits and taxes that result from existing social se- 
curity rules. For example, because benefits are based on the highest thirty-five 
years of earnings, most employees under age twenty-five receive no additional 
benefit for their payroll taxes. Because  many  married  women  and  widows 
claim benefits based on their husbands'  earnings, they also often receive no 
18.  These estimates relate to the experience of taxpayers with 1985 incomes over $30,000 and 
may not be appropriate for the entire population. A similar study by  Gerald Auten and Robert 
Carroll (1994), using a much larger set of panel data that is available only inside the Treasury 
Department, estimated the elasticity to be  1.33, with a standard error of  0.15. In a more recent 
study (Feldstein and Feenberg  1996). Daniel Feenberg and I used the 1993 tax rate increases to 
estimate the elasticity implied by  the experience after the 1993 tax rate increases. We  found a 
short-run compensated elasticity of 0.74, although the interpretation of this is clouded by the lack 
of panel data and by transition issues. 
19. Total wages taxable by the OASDI payroll tax in 1992 were $2.5 trillion. Scaling this up to 
the 1995 level by the increase in total wage and salary disbursements implies a 1995 tax base of 
$2.9 trillion. Since the payroll tax applied only to wages up to $61,200 per person in  1995, this 
$2.9 trillion should be reduced by the entire income of the individuals who earn $61,200 or more 
(for whom the payroll tax has no marginal tax consequence), not just by  the portion of their in- 
comes over $6 1,200. 8  Martin Feldstein 
benefit in return for their payroll taxes. Because there is no extra reward for 
taxes paid at an early date, the effective tax rate on younger taxpayers can be a 
substantial multiple of the effective tax rate of older employees. Indeed, older 
men who are married can actually face a negative marginal social security tax 
rate, receiving more than a dollar in actuarially expected future benefits for 
every dollar that they pay in payroll taxes (Feldstein and Samwick 1992). The 
social security rules are so complex and so opaque that many individuals may 
simply disregard the benefits that they earn from additional working, therefore 
acting as if the entire payroll tax is a net tax no different in kind from the 
personal income tax. 
The extra deadweight loss that results from these very unequal links between 
incremental taxes and incremental benefits would automatically be eliminated 
in a privatized funded system with individual retirement accounts. It can, how- 
ever, also be eliminated within the existing unfunded system by creating indi- 
vidual social security accounts for each taxpayer (as James Buchanan [  19681 
suggested many years ago), crediting the account with the individual's tax pay- 
ments and imputing the average pay-as-you-go return of 2.6 percent.20  But the 
labor market distortions and the resulting deadweight loss that result from the 
low rate of return in an unfunded system cannot be eliminated without shifting 
to either a funded public system or  a privatized system of  individual retire- 
ment accounts.21 
The Welfare Loss of Reduced National Saving 
The deadweight loss that results from labor market distortions is not the 
only adverse effect of  an unfunded social security system or even the largest 
one. Even if  there were no distortions to the labor supply or to the form of 
compensation (i.e., even if the compensated elasticity of the tax base with re- 
spect to net of tax rate were zero), each generation after the initial one would 
lose by being forced to participate in a low-yielding unfunded program, that 
is, by  being forced to accept a pay-as-you-go implicit return of  2.6 percent 
when the real marginal product of capital is 9.3 percent. Even though capital 
income taxes now prevent individuals from receiving that 9.3 percent on their 
own savings, the public as a whole does receive that full return; what individu- 
als do not receive directly they receive in the form of reductions in other taxes 
or increases in government services. 
20.  Tax payments or mandatory contributions of husbands and wives could be pooled and di- 
vided into two separate accounts, thereby providing protection in case of divorce. A fraction of the 
contributions could be automatically devoted to the purchase of life insurance. I do not explore 
these important issues further here. 
21.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)  and Kotlikoff (1996) examine a special model in which the 
labor market distortions can be eliminated in an unfunded system by  having a higher marginal 
link of benefits to taxes than the average benefit-tax ratio. They achieve this with a lump sum tax 
on all employees. This creates no problem in their analysis since all employees are assumed to 
have the same income. In practice, however, a lump sum tax that is large enough to eliminate the 
marginal payroll tax distortion would make the social security payroll tax very regressive. 9  Introduction 
The extent to which an unfunded social security system causes a decline in 
national capital income and economic welfare depends on how individual sav- 
ing responds to social security taxes and benefits and on how the government 
acts to offset the reductions in private saving. 
Consider first the effect on individual saving. Individuals who have had aver- 
age earnings during their entire working life and who retire at age sixty-five 
with a “dependent spouse” now receive benefits equal to 63 percent of  their 
earnings during the full year before retirement. Since the social security bene- 
fits of such individuals are not taxed, those benefits replace more than 80 per- 
cent of peak preretirement net-of-tax  income. Common sense and casual ob- 
servation suggest that individuals who can expect such a high replacement rate 
will do little saving for their retirement. Such saving as they do during their 
preretirement years is more likely to be for precautionary balances to deal with 
unexpected changes in income or consumption. Not surprisingly, the median 
financial assets of households with heads aged fifty-five to sixty-four were only 
$8,300 in  1991, substantially less than six months’ income. Even if we look 
beyond  financial  wealth, the  median  net  worth  (including  the  value  of  the 
home) among all households under sixty-five years of age was only $28,000. 
To get a sense of  the  order of magnitude of the resulting  annual loss of 
aggregate income, it is helpful to begin with the simplest case in which each 
dollar of social security wealth reduces real private wealth by a dollar.**  Since 
the forgone private wealth would have earned the marginal product of capital 
while the unfunded social security system provides a return equal to the growth 
of  aggregate wages, the population incurs a loss equal to the difference be- 
tween those two returns. With a marginal product of capital of 9.3 percent and 
a social security return  of  2.6 percent, the annual loss of real income is 6.7 
percent of social security wealth. The social security wealth of $7 trillion in 
1995 implies an annual loss in that year of $470 billion, or more than 6 percent 
of total GDP. 
Of course, this loss is not directly comparable to the deadweight loss associ- 
ated with  the distortions to labor  supply  and to the  form of compensation. 
Although this loss of investment income affects all generations that pay social 
security taxes, a full welfare evaluation requires comparing these losses to the 
gain of  the initial generation of retirees who received benefits without making 
any contribution and the gains of subsequent retirees who received  windfall 
benefit increases as tax rates rose. 
More generally, this massive potential loss must be qualified by addressing 
three questions. First, how much does the social security system actually de- 
press real capital accumulation? The capital income loss occurs only to the 
extent that the capital stock would be higher with private saving or a funded 
program. Second, how should risk be taken into account in evaluating the loss 
of real income per dollar of forgone capital accumulation? Third, how should 
the windfall gain to the initial generation that received social security benefits 
22.  I discuss the evidence about the effect of social security on saving below. 10  Martin Feldstein 
without making any contribution be balanced against these subsequent losses? 
I deal briefly with each and then turn to the potential benefit of shifting to a 
privatized funded social security program. 
The Induced Change in National Saving 
To assess the effect of the existing social security system on national saving 
we must recognize that social security affects public saving as well as private 
saving. Consider first the effect on public saving. The official surplus of  the 
social security fund in fiscal year  1995 was $69 billion. To what extent does 
this  social security  surplus actually increase real national saving and invest- 
ment? The common criticism, that such a surplus does not raise real investment 
because it is invested exclusively in government bonds, is incorrect. If the so- 
cial security trust fund buys government bonds that would otherwise have been 
sold to the public, it prevents an equal amount of  crowding out and thereby 
does raise the level of real investment. 
The critical issue is therefore how the existence of the social security surplus 
affects the size of the overall (unified) budget deficit. The current budget dis- 
cussions about achieving a balanced budget in the year 2002 use the projected 
social security surplus of $111 billion in that year to offset projected deficits 
elsewhere in the budget. If the goal of a balanced budget in 2002 would have 
been set even if there were no projected social security surplus, then the exis- 
tence of the surplus does not reduce the projected total budget deficit and there- 
fore does not affect the projected future national savings available for invest- 
ment. But, if, as seems more likely, in the absence of a social security surplus 
Congress and the president would have targeted a deficit in 2002 (with the 
budget balanced in some later year), then the projected social security surplus 
does increase projected national saving to some extent, although less than the 
full amount of the projected surplus. 
Similarly, the actual deficit in 1995 would probably have been larger without 
the $69 billion social security surplus, but not $69 billion larger because Con- 
gress  and  the president  would  have enacted  other legislation  to reduce the 
budget deficit. Thus, some part, but only some part, of the $69 billion current 
social security surplus probably does help offset the decline in private saving. 
But, since the $69 billion annual surplus is only one-sixth of  social security 
receipts and the entire social security trust fund is now less than 10 percent of 
social security wealth, the offsetting effect of public saving is not a major con- 
sideration. 
The key issue is therefore the extent to which social security wealth reduces 
private saving. Economic theory alone cannot provide an unambiguous answer. 
Even  if  all individuals were rational  life-cycle savers, each dollar of  social 
security wealth would not necessarily replace exactly a dollar 'of real wealth. 
To the extent that the income-tested character of social security benefits  in- 
duces earlier retirement, individuals will save more than they otherwise would. 11  Introduction 
The relative importance of this induced retirement effect and of the more basic 
wealth replacement effect will vary from individual to individual  (Feldstein 
1974). Social security also affects private saving through an income effect and 
by providing a real annuity.23  Finally, an unknown number of individuals who 
are irrational or myopic may not respond at all to the provision of social secu- 
rity benefits. 
Thus, the extent to which social security wealth substitutes for private real 
wealth accumulation is an empirical issue. A substantial amount of  research 
has been conducted on this question. Like every other important and complex 
issue in economics, different studies do not all point to the same conclusion. 
That is inevitable in empirical economics. As I have argued in a different con- 
text (Feldstein 1982), all empirical specifications in economics are false mod- 
els, oversimplifications that cannot be literally true. Statistical estimates must 
therefore be interpreted with a sensitivity to potential biases,  simplifications, 
data quality problems, and the like. In the end, the researcher must make a 
judgment based on all the evidence rather than by applying traditional theories 
of statistical inference to any individual study. 
What, then, does the evidence tell us about the effect of social security on 
private  saving? At the most basic level is the fact, to which  I  have already 
referred, that most households accumulate little or no financial assets. This is 
consistent with a rational decision to substitute social security benefits for pri- 
vate wealth accumulation (Diamond 1977), but it could also be interpreted as 
evidence that individuals are completely myopic, providing nothing for their 
old age whether  or not  there  are  social security benefits.  However, studies 
based on cross  sections of household data  (including Blinder, Gordon, and 
Wise 1983; Diamond and Hausman  1984; and Feldstein and Pellechio 1979) 
support the substitution hypothesis. Although there remain serious problems 
of statistical identification and data quality and a wide range of parameter esti- 
mates, I interpret the cross-sectional evidence as implying that each extra dol- 
lar of  social security wealth replaces about fifty cents of private wealth accu- 
mulation.  Finally,  there  are  the  time-series  studies  linking  social  security 
wealth  to aggregate private  saving and consumption  (see, e.g., Barro  1978; 
Esposito  1978; Feldstein  1974; and  Leimer  and  Lesnoy  1982). I  recently 
reestimated the specification presented in Feldstein (1974) using time-series 
23.  In principle, individuals who have operative utility-maximizing bequest motives might off- 
set fully the effect of  social security wealth by  increasing their saving in order to compensate 
future generations for the tax burdens implied by  the social security liabilities (Barro  1974). I 
doubt that that effect is empirically very important. My own judgment on this “Ricardian equiva- 
lence” issue is that very few of the individuals who are affected by  social security have operative 
bequest motives. Because future generations can be expected to have higher real incomes, even 
parents who include their children’s  consumption or utility in their own utility functions may prefer 
to receive gifts rather than to make bequests. If children do not wish to support their parents, the 
result is a corner solution in which loving parents do not compensate their children when the value 
of the social security liability increases. On the empirical irrelevance of Ricardian equivalence, 
see, e.g., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992). See also Bernheim (1989). 12  Martin Feldstein 
data through 1992 and tested some of the specifications that others had exam- 
ined with earlier data (Feldstein 1996b). The new parameter values are remark- 
ably close to my original estimates and imply that the existing social security 
wealth reduces overall private saving by nearly 60 percent. 
Although none of these studies establishes definitively a precise substitution 
of  social security wealth for other household wealth, I believe that, taken to- 
gether, these studies do imply that the  social security program causes each 
generation to reduce its savings substantially and thereby to incur a substantial 
loss of real investment income.24 
That the displacement of private saving by social security is less than com- 
plete reduces the loss that each generation incurs from the imposition of an 
unfunded program. But, even if each dollar of social security wealth displaces 
only fifty cents of  private  wealth  accumulation,  the  annual loss of national 
income would exceed 4  percent of GDP.25 
In assessing the aggregate welfare effect of a social security program, the 
loss that results from the depressed level of real capital accumulation must be 
balanced  not only against the  windfall  gain of  the earlier retirees  but  also 
against the gain in protection to those myopic individuals who would otherwise 
have saved too little for their old age.26  Such an analysis is not necessary, how- 
ever, to assess the loss that results from using an unfunded instead of a funded 
program to provide benefits. But, in order to do so, it is necessary to consider 
24.  The decline in the size of the domestic capital stock depends also on the extent to which a 
lower rate of  saving induces an  increased net inflow of  capital from abroad. If  capital flowed 
internationally to maintain the same rate of return everywhere, a decline in the U.S. saving rate 
would induce an equal offsetting inflow from abroad. Although the net-of-tax return on this capital 
would go to the foreign suppliers of this capital, the U.S. government would collect taxes on the 
equity portion of this investment, and the U.S. public would gain a corresponding amount. The 
evidence suggests, however, that the international capital market is sufficiently segmented that 
relatively little capital  flows to replace  the lost US.  saving (see Feldstein and Horioka  1980; 
Feldstein 1994; and Mussa and Goldstein 1993). 
25. Increasing the capital stock by half the 1995 net social security wealth of $7 trillion would 
raise capital income by more than $300 billion, or 4 percent of GDP, if the rate of return remained 
unchanged at 9.3 percent. Such a large increase in the capital stock would of course reduce the 
marginal product of capital. If all the increase in the capital stock went into the domestic capital 
stock (it., if  there were no change in international capital flows), a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with a labor coefficient equal to the share of compensation in national income implies 
that the marginal product of capital would be depressed from 9.3 to 7.9 percent if the incremental 
capital went  only into the business sector (i.e., excluding owner occupied housing) and to 8.3 
percent if the entire capital stock were increased. Of course, the lower return to capital would be 
matched by  a higher return to labor. An increase in the capital stock equal to half of net social 
security wealth would raise the capital stock by about 16 percent and would therefore raise national 
income by  3.8 percent. 
26. If  public policy is committed to an  unfunded social security program, setting the appro- 
priate level of benefits requires balancing the protection of the myopic undersavers against the loss 
to others that results from replacing high yield real capital accumulation with the low implicit 
social security yield. I have examined this optimization problem with the help of  some simple 
models (Feldstein 1985) and concluded that, with realistic estimates of the yield on capital and 
the return on the pay-as-you-go social security system, the replacement ratio of  social security 
benefits to past earnings should be very much lower than it is in the current system. 13  Introduction 
first how the returns on real capital and on social security contributions should 
be adjusted for risk. 
Adjusting Returns for Risks 
Since the portfolio returns to the owners of real capital and the returns to 
participants in a pay-as-you-go social security system are both subject to risk, 
it would be appropriate to evaluate the income loss of an unfunded system by 
considering the lower certainty equivalent values for both the real capital and 
the pay-as-you-go returns. 
The certainty equivalent social rate of return on real capital depends on how 
the risk in that return is shared through the tax system between individual sav- 
ers and the broader p~blic.~’  Taxes paid by  corporations have equaled about 
42 percent of the 9.3 percent real pretax return over the past thirty-five years 
(Rippe 1995), implying a net 5.4 percent average return to savers before per- 
sonal taxesz8  and a 3.9 percent return collected by the government. Variations 
in this source of government revenue are reflected in the short run in the budget 
deficit and, in the longer run, in changes in taxes on all incomes (most of which 
are employment incomes) and in government spending. 
I believe that most individuals who have small amounts of  financial assets 
do not invest in stocks and bonds because the costs of learning how to make 
such investments outweigh the incremental income that would result relative 
to the yield on bank deposits on their very limited financial assets. The very 
small variations in net income imposed on them through their sharing in the 
tax revenue derived from investment income can therefore be ignored, taking 
the mean value of that income as the certainty eq~ivalent.~~  It is reasonable 
therefore to use the mean value (of 3.9 percent) as the relevant certainty equiv- 
alent for the part of the return to capital that is collected by the government. 
What is the appropriate certainty equivalent for the 5.4 percent return that 
accrues to individual savers? A relatively conservative choice is the real yield 
on ten-year government bonds, a return of 2.5 percent between 1960 and 1994. 
Combining the 3.9 percent return collected in taxes and this 2.5 percent cer- 
tainty equivalent return received by individuals gives a total certainty equiva- 
lent return of 6.4 percent instead of the expected return of 9.3 percent. 
27.  This issue is discussed in Feldstein (1995d).  Arrow and Lind (1970)  explain that the funda- 
mental principle for the evaluation of risky public expenditures is that the value of benefits should 
be reduced if a substantial risk is borne by the individual but that the expected value is an appro- 
priate certainty equivalent for the part of the benefits and costs that the government spreads to all 
taxpayers through the tax system. 
28.  I assume that the alternative to the unfunded program would be a funded program in which 
the individual saver would get a return net of the corporate tax but not subject to any personal 
taxes. If additional personal taxes were levied, the certainty equivalent would get even closer to 
the expected value. 
29.  This implicitly assumes that the variation in portfolio income is uncorrelated with shocks 
to their income and consumption. 14  Martin Feldstein 
It is less clear how the 2.6 percent return of  the unfunded social security 
program  should be adjusted for risk. The future return  that individuals will 
receive on their social security taxes depends on the growth of aggregate real 
wages, on the changing age structure of the population, and on political deci- 
sions about taxes  and benefits.  During the period  since  1960, the  forward- 
looking increase in aggregate real wages for completed twenty-year  periods 
varied from a low of  1.5 percent to a high of 3.0 percent.  Changes in demo- 
graphic structure added to the fluctuations in available returns. And, in recent 
years, the value of future social security benefits has been decreased by  sub- 
jecting them to tax and by increasing the retirement age at which full benefits 
are paid. 
One possibility  would be to assume that the return on social security is as 
uncertain as the real return on investment in plant and equipment, suggesting 
that the appropriate difference between the two certainty equivalents may be 
the same as the difference between the two mean values, or 6.7 percent. An 
alternative extreme assumption would be to adjust the return on real capital for 
risk but to make no adjustment in the return on the social security program, 
implying a risk-adjusted difference of only 3.8 percent, that is, the difference 
between the 6.4 percent certainty equivalent yield on real capital and the 2.6 
percent expected return on social security wealth. Note that even this low 3.8 
percentage point difference in returns implies that substituting the existing $7 
trillion  unfunded  social security wealth  for a funded program of equal size 
implies a risk-adjusted income loss of nearly 4 percent of GDP.30 
In short, while risk adjustment might change the specific magnitude of the 
annual loss, even with a very conservative risk adjustment, the loss of having 
a funded rather than an unfunded program remains very substantial. 
Initial Gains and Subsequent Losses 
I turn now to the issue of how to balance the gain to those generations of 
beneficiaries in an unfunded system who receive benefits without contributing 
a corresponding amount and the losses to all future generations who forgo the 
higher yield that would be earned on real capitaL3' 
When  a social security program  first begins,  the  government collects an 
amount in taxes that it distributes to the then current retirees, if the program is 
unfunded, or that it invests in the national capital stock, if the program is to be 
funded. The same thing happens again whenever the tax rate is increased to 
30. See n.  25 above. A $7 trillion increase in the  1995 capital stock would raise the capital 
stock by about 33 percent and, assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology with a capital coefficient of 
0.25, would raise national income by 7.4 percent. Labor would receive about three-fourths of this 
increase. This calculation ignores the risk adjustment and the offset for the implicit pay-as-you-go 
return on  social security wealth. A 2.6 percent pay-as-you-go return on social security wealth 
would be about 2.5 percent of GDP. 
31. A more formal analysis of this issue is presented in the appendix. 15  Introduction 
finance a relative increase in benefits or an expansion of coverage. To simplify 
the current discussion, I ignore the role of subsequent expansions and consider 
only the windfall benefits to the initial generation. 
If each dollar collected by an unfunded program reduces national saving, 
each generation after the initial one incurs a loss that reflects the difference 
between  the marginal product of  the displaced  capital and the return  on the 
unfunded program (i.e., the growth rate of aggregate wages). The key question 
is whether the present value of the losses to all future generations exceeds the 
windfall benefit that the initial generation received without having paid any tax. 
To compare these magnitudes, the future losses must be discounted at a rate 
that reflects the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption declines over 
time. The dollar loss to each subsequent generation grows at the same rate as 
aggregate  wages.  Discounting  this  growing  stream  of  losses  at  a  constant 
discount rate is therefore equivalent to applying a growth-adjusted discount 
rate-that  is, the difference between the discount rate and the growth rate- 
to a constant perpetual loss at the level incurred by the first generation of los- 
ers. Thus, the  present value of  the  losses is equal to the  amount of capital 
displaced by the initial transfer of taxes multiplied by the ratio of the reduced 
rate of return-that  is, the difference between the risk-adjusted marginal prod- 
uct  of  capital  and  the  risk-adjusted  social  security return-to  the  growth- 
adjusted discount rate. 
To simplify this discussion, assume now that the unfunded program reduces 
national saving by a dollar for every dollar that it collects in taxes.32  Since the 
initial generation receives a benefit equal to the initial amount of the tax, the 
adoption of  an unfunded plan rather than a funded plan causes a net present 
value loss if the return difference per dollar of forgone investment exceeds the 
growth-adjusted discount rate. This condition is satisfied for any plausible val- 
ues of the parameters, implying that the present value of the future losses ex- 
ceeds the value of  the initial transfer. 
Consider the following example. If one adopts the very conservative proce- 
dure of risk adjusting the return to private capital but making no adjustment to 
the return on social security taxes, the lost rate of  return is 3.8 percent. The 
present value of the future losses therefore exceeds the value of the initial gen- 
eration’s windfall if the growth-adjusted discount rate is less than 3.8 percent. 
Since the growth rate is 2.6 percent, this is satisfied if the real discount rate 
itself is less than 6.4 percent, a condition that is certainly warranted, 
With a more plausible but still very conservative  high discount rate of  4 
percent,33  the risk-adjusted annual loss of 3.8 percent of displaced investment 
32.  The assumption of one-for-one substitution simplifies by  abstracting from income effects 
and individual myopia. Alternatively, the alternative to an unfunded program might be considered 
to be a funded program. The more general case of less than one-for-one substitution is discussed 
in the appendix. 
33.  The discount rate should reflect the decline in the marginal utility of per capita consumption 
that results from the growth of per capita real wages. With per capita real wage growth at about 16  Martin Feldstein 
implies a present value loss of an unfunded program that is nearly three times 
as large (when discounted back to the start of the program) as the windfall 
benefit to the initial  retiree^.'^ 
The Potential Gain from Privatization 
This framework for thinking about the cost implied by an unfunded program 
can be used to assess whether a gain in economic welfare could be achieved 
by  shifting to a privatized  system in which each employee has a retirement 
account into which the employee andor the employer must make regular peri- 
odic contributions that are then invested in stocks and bonds. The government 
may recognize its obligations to existing retirees and employees at the time of 
privatization by depositing in these retirement accounts new government bonds 
equal to the present value of the benefits to which the individual is then entitled 
on the basis of past contributions to the unfunded system. Funds in these new 
retirement accounts can be used to purchase annuities, or withdrawn gradually 
when  the  individual reaches  retirement  age,  or bequeathed  to  a  spouse or 
other heirs.35 
A skeptic might ask whether this “privatization”  really  accomplishes any- 
thing since it merely converts the existing unfunded social security obligations 
into explicit government  debt with the  same present value. That skepticism 
would be warranted in a static economy but is not appropriate when economic 
growth is continually enlarging the size of the social security liability. Shifting 
from an unfunded to a funded program is an application of the general prin- 
ciple that, when you discover that you are in a hole, the first thing to do is to 
stop digging. Shifting to a funded system eliminates the future losses associ- 
ated with future increases in the size of social security wealth. 
In the first year after the privatization of a pay-as-you-go system, there is no 
increase in the capital stock because the government would have to borrow all 
the mandatory saving to pay benefits to existing retirees. But, as time passes, 
1.6 percent a year, the appropriate discount rate is less than the critical value of 6.4 percent if the 
elasticity of the marginal utility function is less than the extremely high value of 4. An elasticity 
of 2, e.g., which is high enough to imply that the marginal utility of consumption is halved about 
every forty-five years, corresponds to a discount rate of 3.2 percent. With aggregate wage growth 
of 2.6 percent, this implies a growth-adjusted discount rate of  only 0.6 percent. 
34.  Recall that, to simplify the discussion, I have assumed that there was only one initial wind- 
fall. The actual loss reflects all subsequent program expansions as well. 
A discount rate of 4 percent implies a growth-adjusted discount rate of 1.4 percent. The present 
value of the losses is thus (3.8/1.4 =) 2.7 times the initial transfer. With a more plausible discount 
rate of  3.2 percent, the corresponding loss would be 6.3 times the initial transfer. And, if the return 
to social security is given the same risk adjustment as the return to real capital, the loss becomes 
([9.3 -  2.6]/0.6 =) 11.2 times the initial transfer. 
35.  An  alternative to explicitly creating these “recognition bonds” is to provide future retire- 
ment benefits based on past contributions but to stop accruing any further entitlements to pay-as- 
you-go benefits. That is the approach developed in Feldstein and Samwick (chap. 6 in this volume). 17  Introduction 
the amount of net capital investment grows (because the mandatory  saving 
rises with the number of employees and their average incomes), while the net 
social security debt that is explicitly recognized at privatization remains con- 
stant. As a result, the capital stock grows and, with it, the incremental income.36 
The net effect in each year consists of two parts: a gain equal to the real risk- 
adjusted return on the increase in the capital stock and a loss of the implicit 
social security return on the taxes paid. As the incremental capital stock grows, 
the net effect shifts from negative to positive and then increases without limit. 
The magnitude of the gain depends on the form of the transition. In the long 
run, if  the risk-adjusted return  on capital is 6.4 percent,  the implicit return 
on the unfunded social security 2.6 percent, and the appropriate consumption 
discount rate 4 percent, the present value gain is nearly equal to the current 
value of the unfunded program. Approximating  the current value of the un- 
funded program by the social security wealth implies a potential present value 
gain of nearly $7 trillion. 
It is hard to put such a large sum in perspective. It may help to note that, 
with the assumed discount rate and GDP growth rate, that present value gain 
from privatization is equivalent to  1.4 percent of  GDP starting immediately 
and continuing in perpetuity. Although this way of scaling the magnitude of the 
benefit may be useful, when thinking about the political economy of reform, it 
is also worth bearing in mind that the potential gain from the one-time political 
act of  shifting to a funded program has such an enormous positive present 
value. 
This is just the gain from increasing real capital accumulation. In addition, 
the shift to a funded program would also reduce the deadweight losses that 
are now  caused by  a payroll tax that distorts labor supply and the form of 
compensation. Recall that this reduction in deadweight loss is the portion that 
cannot be obtained by redistributing the existing implicit return but depends 
on raising the rate of return on social security contributions from the rate of 
growth of wages to the real return on capital. This $68 billion deadweight loss 
for 1995 corresponds in the long run to an additional 1  .O percent of GDP. 
Foreign Experience with Privatization 
The five individual country chapters in part 1 of this volume show how very 
different countries have managed the transition from systems based on un- 
funded government programs to systems that depend primarily on individual 
funded accounts. It is clear that no two systems are identical, reflecting differ- 
ences in starting conditions, demographic circumstances, and political oppor- 
36. In the transition presented in Feldstein and Samwick (chap. 6 in this volume), the pay-as- 
you-go benefits decline over time as retired individuals are able to rely more on the mandatory 
savings that they had accumulated during their working years. 18  Martin Feldstein 
tunities. Despite these differences, however, there is a core of common struc- 
tural features. 
In order to compare the evolution of the different systems and the structure 
of the privatized  programs, I asked the authors of each of the country papers 
to address a common set of questions. Each country paper therefore begins by 
describing the social security pension  system before  the reform. It then dis- 
cusses the reasons that the change was made and the steps that were needed to 
make the shift politically possible. The main part of  each country paper is a 
detailed description  of the new  system, dealing with such issues as whether 
participation  is mandatory, the contribution  rate  and base, the nature  of the 
fund management and selection of investment options, and the ways that bene- 
fits are paid. Careful attention is given to the transition to the new system and 
the way that employees and retirees are treated in the transition. Although some 
of the systems are relatively new, the authors also discuss the likely effects of 
the new system on saving and capital markets in their respective countries. 
Privatization Issues for the United States 
Part 2 of this volume contains five papers that explore issues that are relevant 
to the consideration of privatization in the United States. Feldstein and Sam- 
wick (chap. 6) examine alternative feasible transitions from the existing U.S. 
social security program to a system of funded individual accounts, calculating 
the changes in the age-specific contributions that would occur along the transi- 
tion path if current tax rate or benefit schedules were preserved and no change 
was made in the government borrowing requirements.  Kotlikoff (chap. 7) ex- 
tends  the Auerbach-Kotlkoff  multiperiod  overlapping  generations  model  to 
study the general equilibrium effects on capital accumulation, wages, and wel- 
fare of alternative ways of financing the obligations to existing employees and 
retirees if the current system were replaced with voluntary funded contribu- 
tions to individual accounts. Gustman and Steinmeier (chap. 8) focus on the 
retirement decisions and explore how alternative transitions rules would affect 
retirement behavior. Poterba and Wise (chap. 9) study the investment choices 
of  employees with 401(k) and IRA accounts to assess how individual  asset 
allocation  decisions  might be made in the accounts created  by  a privatized 
social security system. They also examine some of  the issues associated with 
the choice between annuities and other methods of paying benefits over time. 
Finally, Mitchell (chap. 10) discusses the issue of administrative costs and the 
experience of U.S. and foreign fund managers and pension programs. 
As I noted in the preface, the papers in this volume are part of an ongoing 
research program. The countries that are switching to privatized  systems are 
still in the process of transition,  and their problems and achievements  merit 
continued study. Although the papers dealing with the issues that the United 
States would  confront  in  considering  a shift to individual  accounts provide 
substantial new  information,  they  also help focus on issues that are not  yet 19  Introduction 
well enough understood. These are the subjects of  NBER research currently 
under way. 
Appendix 
The Effect of Privatizing Social Security on 
Economic Welfare 
This appendix presents a more formal analysis of the economic gains that re- 
sult from shifting from an unfunded pay-as-you-go system of retirement bene- 
fits to a funded system.37  The analysis clarifies the way that the welfare gain 
from privatization depends on the productivity of capital, the rate of growth of 
real wages, and the rate at which future consumption is discounted to the pres- 
ent. To  simplify the analysis, I focus on the comparison of future consumption 
gains and current short-term consumption  losses, ignoring the sizable dead- 
weight losses associated with labor supply distortions that would be eliminated 
in the process of privatization. 
The first section of this appendix reviews the simple analytics of replacing 
private  saving with an unfunded  social security system. The second  section 
then builds on this to examine the potential gain from shifting from an un- 
funded system to a funded system, bearing in mind the obligations to existing 
retirees and employees. The analysis assumes that the shift to the funded sys- 
tem raises the national saving rate by the full amount of the taxes collected by 
the unfunded system, thereby substantially increasing the level of real benefits. 
The third section repeats the analysis of the second section with the alternative 
assumption that the funded system has a smaller contribution rate that is se- 
lected to provide the same level of  benefits as the existing unfunded system. 
There are a variety of possible mechanisms for dealing with the obligations 
to existing employees  and retirees.  The current analysis assumes that these 
obligations are converted to an explicit national debt (the so-called recognition 
bonds) that is then serviced in perpetuity. Alternative assumptions would im- 
plicitly involve different schedules for repaying the recognition  debt without 
the formal creation of recognition bonds. 
Surprisingly,  there  has  been  no explicit  analysis of  the conditions  under 
which privatizing social security would increase economic welfare.38  The po- 
37.  An earlier version of this appendix appeared as Feldstein (1995d). 
38.  Samuelson (1958) showed that the introduction of  a pay-as-you-go program would raise 
the welfare of every generation in an economy in which there can be no capital stock (because all 
goods are perishable) and therefore no opportunity to earn a return greater than the rate of increase 
of  the tax base. Aaron (1966) noted that a dynamically inefficient economy that is producing with 
a capital intensity greater than the golden rule level (i.e., in which the marginal product of capital 
is less than the rate of aggregate economic growth) could also raise economic welfare by introduc- 
ing an unfunded social security program because doing so would reduce the initial excessive level 20  Martin Feldstein 
tential ambiguity  of the effect occurs because, while each future generation 
would  benefit from earning the higher return on real investments instead of 
getting a return equal to the rate of increase of the payroll tax base, these future 
generations would also be obligated to pay taxes to finance the interest on the 
extra national debt created in the process of pri~atization.~~  The question of 
whether privatizing social security raises economic welfare is therefore equiva- 
lent to asking whether the burden of financing the extra debt is less than the 
gain from the return on the incremental real saving. 
The Welfare Loss of Introducing an Unfunded Social Security Program 
Consider a simple overlapping generations (OLG) model with no social se- 
curity program in which individuals live for two periods, earning w,  in the first 
period  and saving 5,. If  the marginal  product  of capital  is  p,  the individuals 
consume sr(  1 + p) in retirement. 
Now introduce an unfunded social security program at time t = 0 financed 
by a payroll tax at rate 0.  The proceeds of the tax are paid to the current retirees. 
In the next period, the population has increased by a factor of  1 + n and the 
common wage rate by a factor of 1 + g. The taxes collected in that next period 
are therefore Ow(,(  1 + n)(l + g) = Ow,( 1 + y), where wo  is the wage when the 
social security program is introduced. The members of the initial generation 
of employees thus receive  1 + y dollars of benefits  in retirement  for every 
dollar of tax that they paid while working. 
If the requirement to pay a social security payroll tax induces individuals to 
reduce their saving by  an equal amount,4o  the loss of income in retirement  is 
(p -  y)Ow,.  The present value of this loss to the individual at the time that the 
social security program is introduced is (1 + p)-'(p -  y)Ow,. 
of the capital stock. But, in the empirically relevant case in which the marginal product of capital 
exceeds the growth rate, the substitution of an unfunded social security program for capital accu- 
mulation can reduce economic welfare. Feldstein (1987b) presented an explicit formula for the 
welfare cost of social security's adverse effect on private saving similar to the analysis in the first 
section of  this appendix. Feldstein (1985) derived the optimal level of  benefits in an  unfunded 
system and showed conditions under which that optimum would be zero. Feldstein ( 1995a) states 
the potential loss in present value consumption from introducing an unfunded program but does 
not discuss the consequences of  switching from an  unfunded to a funded system. Analyses by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and by  Seidman (1983, 1986)  have discussed the effects of reduc- 
ing the benefits of existing retirees but not those of privatizing the existing system with benefits 
unchanged. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1996) show that 
shifting to a funded system would raise welfare by reducing the distortions to labor supply caused 
by existing payroll taxes. 
39.  More fundamentally, future generations would  lose the income generated by  the capital 
stock that is crowded out by  the creation of the new debt. This is equivalent to the interest on the 
national debt when the rate of interest paid by  the government is equal to the marginal product of 
capital in the private economy. 
40.  Because the program reduces the present value of lifetime income, it would be expected to 
cause a fall in first-period consumption  and therefore a less than one-for-one displacement of 
private saving by the social security tax. This effect reduces the magnitude of the loss from intro- 
ducing an unfunded program. 21  Introduction 
If the number of  employees is initially  N,,  the loss to future generation t 
when the wage rate is wo(  1 + g)’ and the labor force is No( 1 + n)’ is 
where T, is the initial aggregate payroll tax and therefore the initial transfer to 
the first generation of retirees. If the appropriate rate for discounting consump- 
tion of future generations is 6,4l the present value of the loss to employee parti- 
cipants of all generations (i.e., ignoring the gain to the initial generation of 
retirees) is 
Note first that, if the economy is at the golden rule level of capital intensity 
(i.e., that p = y), there is no loss to any generation of employees. The transfer 
to the initial retirees is a clear Pareto improvement. 
In reality, of course, p >  y, and each generation of employees incurs a loss.4z 
Note, however, that, if 6 = p,  the loss to future retirees just balances the transfer 
to the initial retirees (PVL = To)  regardless of the difference between p and y. 
In this case, the present value of the loss to all future generations is exactly 
equal to the value of the transfer to the initial retirees. If, however, the intergen- 
erational consumption discount rate is less than the marginal product of capi- 
tal, the loss exceeds To, and the introduction of  an unfunded social security 
program reduces the present value of future incomes by more than the value 
of the transfer to the initial retirees 
The condition 6 = p implies that the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption  in one generation and consumption in the next is equal to the 
marginal rate of transformation. Equivalently, the existing level of capital is 
optimal in the sense of maximizing the intergenerational social welfare func- 
tion subject only to the constraint of the intergenerational production function. 
Equation (Al) implies that, if the economy is operating at this first-best opti- 
mum level of capital intensity, there is no loss from a small shift of consump- 
tion from future generations to the current generation. In the more relevant 
case in which tax rules or other distorting factors cause p >  6, shifting a dollar 
from investment to current consumption reduces the present value of the total 
41, The appropriate rate for discounting consumption across generations is discussed on page 
42.  The relation of  p and y is discussed on page 24. See also Feldstein (1965) and Abel et 
43. Equation (Al) implies PVL > To  if y > -I  and p > 6. Since y is the growth rate of 
25. 
al. (1989). 
aggregate real labor income, y > 0 > -  1. 22  Martin Feldstein 
consumption stream. Such a shift from investment to current consumption  is 
exactly what the introduction of an unfunded social security program does and 
why, if p > 6, it causes the present value of consumption to fall. 
Whether the introduction  of  an unfunded  social security program does in 
fact reduce the present value of consumption depends also on the extent to 
which it provides benefits that raise the consumption  of retirees who would 
otherwise have saved “too little” for their own retirement.44 Such myopic be- 
havior would be precluded by  the assumption that 0w,  <  s,,  that is, that each 
individual’s social security payroll tax is less than the amount that the individ- 
ual would otherwise save. But, if some individuals would have saved less than 
the payroll tax, the evaluation must go beyond the present value calculation of 
equation (Al) to reflect the utility  gain from providing benefits to “myopic” 
retirees in each generation. When there are enough myopic individuals, the 
gain from helping them by even an unfunded social security program can out- 
weigh the loss associated with giving a lower return to rational savers.4s 
Although the balancing of this gain to myopes against the loss to rational 
savers is important in deciding whether to introduce a mandatory retirement 
program and in setting the scale of benefits, it is not relevant for deciding be- 
tween a funded and an unfunded program since myopes would be protected at 
least as much under a funded program as under an unfunded program.46 
The Welfare Gain from Privatizing Social Security 
Privatizing social security requires recognizing the obligation to existing re- 
tirees and to others who have already paid payroll taxes under the pay-as-you- 
go system. This appendix models that recognition as the explicit creation of 
additional national debt of equal value that is serviced in perpet~ity.~’  Each 
future generation therefore bears a burden because of the additional national 
debt that must be balanced against the higher retirement income4*  that results 
from substituting  real  saving for the pay-as-you-go  program.  Since a debt- 
financed privatization of social security does not reduce the benefits of existing 
44.  Feldstein (1985) analyzed the issue of inadequate individual saving by modeling the repre- 
sentative  individual  in  a  two-period  OLG  model  as  having  a  true  lifetime  utility  function 
u(c,) + u(cJ but acting while young to maximize u(c,) + Xu(cJ with A < 1 for “partial myopia” 
and A = 0 for “complete myopia.” 
45.  Feldstein (1985)  derives the optimal level of social security benefits in an unfunded system 
by  balancing the gains to myopes against the loss to those who would otherwise have saved opti- 
mally. 
46.  If the mandatory saving level in the funded program is as large as the tax in the pay-as-you- 
go program, retirement benefits are even higher in the funded program. 
47.  Feldstein and Samwick (chap. 6 in this volume) assume that the debt is not explicitly stated 
but that the retirees and existing employees receive the benefits that they have accumulated on the 
basis of past contributions to the unfunded program. No additional national debt remains after the 
last of these employees has died. This is equivalent to creating explicit national debt and amortiz- 
ing it over the life of the youngest current employee. 
48.  The third section considers the alternative of lower pension contributions (instead of higher 
retirement benefits). 23  Introduction 
Table A.l  Receipts and Payments of Overlapping Generations 
t  t+  1  t+2  t+  3 
Social security program and participants: 
Unfunded: 
Retirees (benefits)  +  T,  +  T,  ( 1 + y)  +  T,  (1 + y)>  +T,(1 + y)3 
Employees (taxes)  -  T,  -  T,  ( 1 + y)  -  T, (1 + y)z  -T,(l + 7)' 
Retireesu  +T,  +T, (1 + P)  +T, (1 + y)(l + PI  +T,(1 + r)Z(l + P) 
Employeesb  -T,  -T, (I + y)  -T, (1 + y)'  -T, (1 + Y)3 
Debt  0  -PT  -PT,  -  PT, 
Net receipts  0  -yT,  [(I + YKP -  y) -  PIT,  [(I + y)Yp -  y) -  PIT, 
Net  00  0  0 
Privatized: 
"Under the privatized funded plan, retirees receive benefits at time t and then receive the principal and 
earnings on their savings for all t > 0. 
bundm  the privatize funded plan, employees save these amounts. 
retirees, the  welfare effect depends on the relative  magnitude  of the future 
retirement income gains and the future debt service requirements. 
In the OLG model of the first section, the privatization process that begins 
at time t is equivalent to reducing the payroll tax on the current generation of 
employees by T,  and issuing national debt of TI.  If that generation of employees 
increases saving by the amount of the tax reduction, this incremental saving is 
just enough to absorb the additional national debt.49  The debt service during 
each period in the future is PT,.~" 
Table A.l shows the first four periods of the sequence of income and saving 
under the existing unfunded plan and the alternative privatized funded plan. 
With the unfunded system, taxes and benefits are equal to each other in each 
period and increase at the rate of growth of  aggregate wages (y). With the 
privatized funded system, (mandatory) saving is by assumption the same as the 
employees would otherwise have paid  in payroll  taxes. Retirees continue to 
receive  transfer funded benefits  only in the first period of  the transition  (at 
time t)  and then receive the income and principle from their private saving. In 
49.  Although the initial employees are required to save T,  in the mandatory private saving fund, 
they may reduce (or increase) other saving in response to the income effect of privatization. If 
capital income taxes distort the lifetime distribution of each individual's consumption, a change in 
saving induced by these income effects will have a first-order effect on individual lifetime welfare. 
Talung this into account explicitly would not alter the condition under which privatizing an un- 
funded social security program raises the present value of consumption, but it  would alter the 
magnitude of the gain. 
50. Although the government may pay a net interest rate that is less than the marginal product 
of capital, the fact that national debt absorbs the private saving (and thereby displaces an equal 
amount of  investment) implies that the lost return is the marginal product of capital. I return in the 
next section to the relation between the marginal product of capital and the net of tax yields on 
private securities and government debt. 24  Martin Feldstein 
addition, the existence of the government debt reduces real income (by crowd- 
ing out private capital) in each period by pT,. 
Note that, at time t, there is no difference between the outlays and receipts 
of retirees and employees under the existing unfunded plan and under the alter- 
native debt-financed funded plan. At t + 1, the retirees receive T,(  1 + p), an 
improvement of (p -  y)T,  in comparison to the unfunded  system. But some 
combination of retirees and employees must also bear the cost of debt service 
pT,. The net effect of privatization on consumption at time t + 1 is therefore 
Table A. 1 shows that, while the negative effect of debt service remains con- 
stant at  -pT,,  the retiree’s gain from shifting to  a funded plan increases  in 
proportion to the growing level of aggregate wages (p -  y)( 1 + y)’. The effect 
of privatization eventually shifts from negative to positive. Privatizing the sys- 
tem raises the present value of consumption if the discounted value of the in- 
creased retirement consumption (C,=,  [p -  y]T,[l  + y]’-I[l  + s]-’)  exceeds 
the present value of the debt service (C,=,  pT,[l  + S]-:).  The present  value 
gain from privatizing is 
-yT,. 
(A2)  PVG  = C (p - y)T(l + y)”-l(l + S)-‘  - C pl;(l  + S)-’ 
I  I 
or, equivalently, 
(A31  PVG  = [(p - y)/(S - y) - p/S]T. 
Thus, PVG > 0, and privatization raises the present value of consumption 
only if three conditions are met: p > y (the return on capital exceeds the im- 
plicit return in the unfunded program), p >  S (the capital intensity of the econ- 
omy is below the welfare-maximizing level), and y >  0 (the economy is grow- 
ing). Why does privatization raise the present value of consumption only when 
all three conditions  are satisfied? First, an unfunded  system has an inferior 
return to employees in each generation only if p > y. If p 5  y, the economy 
is dynamically inefficient, and consumption can be raised permanently by re- 
ducing the initial capital stock. Even if  p > y,  the annual gains ([p -  y]T, 
[  1 + y]‘) have a present value that exceeds the initial transfer to retirees only 
if the marginal rate of transformation between present and future consumption 
exceeds the  marginal  rate of  substitution  between  consumption  in different 
generations (p >  6). Both are also the necessary conditions for the introduction 
of  an unfunded  program to reduce  welfare.  If  they are not  satisfied,  an un- 
funded program raises welfare (even if there are no myopic individuals), and 
replacing it with a funded private program is therefore welfare decreasing. 
The additional condition  (y > 0) is now  required to make the gain from 
increased retirement income exceed the cost of the additional national debt. A 
positive rate of growth is important in this context because the annual gain to 
retirees grows with the size of the economy while the cost of the increased 
national debt remains constant. If the economy did not grow, the annual gain 25  Introduction 
to the retirees would remain constant at (p -  y)T,, which, with y = 0, is pT,, 
exactly the same as the cost of debt service. 
Privatizing social security raises economic welfare only if the economy is 
growing because only in a growing economy does the shift to a funded pro- 
gram avoid the rising loss of  an increasingly large unfunded program in the 
future. The privatization at time t just substitutes national debt for the existing 
social security liabilities with no net present value gain, but, in a growing econ- 
omy, privatization prevents the automatic impositions of a larger inefficient 
social security program in the future. 
For any realistic economy, all three inequalities are likely to be satisfied, and 
therefore a shift to a funded program is likely to raise economic welfare. The 
next section discusses the evaluation of y, p,  and 6 and the implied present 
value gain from a debt-financed privatizing of the existing U.S. social security 
retirement benefits. 
Parameter Values and the Estimated Net Gain 
The values associated with the three key parameters (y, p, and 6) that were 
discussed in the text of this introductory chapter imply the critical inequalities 
(p > 6 and 6 > y > 0) and provide the basis for calculating a theoretical 
estimate of the net gain from privatizing social security. More specifically, the 
experience in the United States since 1960 implies y = 0.026 and p = 0.093. 
The text suggests that the certainty equivalent rate of return that replaces the 
return to portfolio investors with the yield on government bonds is 6.4 percent, 
which will be denoted p* = 0.064. Finally, the corresponding certainty equiva- 
lent for the return on the unfunded program will be written y*.  If the risk of 
the social security program is ignored, y* = y = 0.026, while, if social secu- 
rity is deemed to be as risky as portfolio investments, p* -  y* = P-Y= 
0.093 -  0.026 = 0.067. 
The derivation of equation (A3) for the present value gain from privatizing 
social security implies that 
(-44)  PVG  = [(p* - y*)/(6 - y) - p*/6]q. 
Note that the y* in the numerator refers to the certainty equivalence return in 
the unfunded social security program. The value of y in the denominator refers 
to the effect of  the economy’s growth on the future size of  the program and 
therefore is not a rate of return subject to a certainty equivalence adjustment. 
There are two conceptually different approaches to defining the appropriate 
rate  of  intergenerational  discounting  (6). The  first  begins  with  the  view 
that  the  generations  are  linked  by  family  altruism so that  the  appropriate 
rate of discount between generations is the same as the rate of discount within 
generations. This implies that the relevant discount rate is the real net yield 
that  individuals  receive. If  considerations  of  risk  are ignored,  this  implies 
6 = (1 -  T)rN,  where T is the marginal individual tax rate, and rN  is the return 26  Martin Feldstein 
after corporate taxes but before individual taxes. With a relatively conservative 
estimate of T  = 0.2, and with r,  = 0.055, this approach implies 6 = 0.044. If 
the real net return on government bonds is regarded as a more appropriate risk- 
adjusted measure, 6 = r,,  = 0.010. In either case, it is clear that p >  6. Using 
6 = r,,  implies that 6 < y and therefore that the appropriate discount rate is 
less than the rate of  growth of  the social security program. In this case, the 
present values in equations (Al), (A2), and (A3) do not exist; the loss of  in- 
come of an unfunded social security program (p* -  y*)T,(  1 + y)‘ grows faster 
than the discount factor. But, although the present value is not defined, it is 
clear that the discounted loss of  introducing an unfunded social security pro- 
gram exceeds the value of the initial transfer within a finite number of years. 
Similarly, the discounted gain from a debt-financed transition to a funded pro- 
gram exceeds the cost within a finite number of years. 
The second approach to defining 6 rejects the use of a market rate for inter- 
generational discounting on the grounds that the generations are not linked by 
operative bequest motives and that the preferences of  the current generation 
should not determine the relative values to be put on consumption  in  future 
generations. The rate of discount must therefore be derived from the structure 
of the utility function. The common assumption of an additive separable con- 
stant elasticity utility  function implies that  6 = (y -  n)q, where y -  n  is 
the rate of increase of  per capita incomes, and -q  is the absolute elasticity of 
marginal ~tility.~’ 
Between  1960 and  1994, the population growth rate was n = 0.011, im- 
plying y -  n = 0.015. Plausible values of the elasticity of the marginal utility 
function are generally taken to be about -q = 2, implying that 0 < y < 6 < p, 
the condition that implies a positive but finite discounted value of the gains 
from a debt-financed  shift from an unfunded to a funded social security pro- 
gram. Values of q < 1.7 imply 6 <  y and therefore that the gains from shifting 
to a funded program grow faster than the discount rate. In this range, the pres- 
ent value gain from a debt-financed shift to a funded program increases without 
limit as the time horizon is extended. Only an implausibly high q >  4.2 would 
imply 6 > p* = 0.064 and therefore a net loss from a debt-financed  shift to a 
funded system. 
Effect of Constant Benefits and Reduced Taxes 
The calculations in the second and third sections may be regarded as unreal- 
istic because they assume that the mandatory saving in a funded system would 
be as large as the contributions to the unfunded system. That may  not occur 
because it would imply a much higher level of retirement income with no in- 
crease in net income during working years. An alternative “extreme” assump- 
5 I. Let the social welfare function be 1  u(c,j, where c, is mean per capita consumption at time 
f and u(c,) = kc;“.  Then  I  + 6 = MRS(r,, c,,,)  = (1 + y -  n)” 3 I  + (y -  tijr(. 27  Introduction 
tion is that contributions  in the funded program are set to produce the same 
benefits as in the current unfunded system. 
With  this  assumption,  each generation  of  employees  saves  the  fraction 
(1 + y)/(l + p) times  what  it would  pay  as payroll tax  with an unfunded 
system. This implies that the analogue to equation (A3) is 
(A5)  PVG  =  { [(l + @/(I + p*)][(p*  - y*)/(S - ?)I  - p*/S}T. 
The difference is that the gross gain (before taking into account the debt ser- 
vice cost) is reduced by a factor of (1 + 6)/(  1 + p*), reflecting the fact that, 
with the smaller saving, the gain is reduced. If individuals were permitted to 
supplement mandatory saving and earn the return p*, this reduction could be 
eliminated. 
Other variations on the basic theme could be considered, including debt am- 
ortization instead of a perpetual increase in the debt. These have consequences 
for the intergenerational distribution as well as for the net present value gain. 
Rather than  consider  more  such possibilities in this simplified theoretical 
framework,  it  is  better  to study  them  with  actual  parameter  values  (as in 
Feldstein and Samwick, chap. 6 in this volume). But the current analysis has 
been sufficient to indicate why gains occur and how, in a qualitative sense, they 
are related to the rates of growth of wages, the productivity of capital, and the 
rate of consumption discount. 
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